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543 
PURPOSE AND INTENT: SEEKING A MORE 
CONSISTENT APPROACH TO STREAM OF 
COMMERCE PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whether a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant 
because the defendant manufactured an allegedly defective product that 
caused an injury in the forum has proved to be a difficult question in the 
United States. Despite multiple efforts, the Supreme Court has not 
developed a definite standard for determining what conduct subjects a 
manufacturer to personal jurisdiction in a given forum.1 This confusion 
arises largely out of the Court’s varied interpretations of the “stream of 
commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction. Beginning with the Court’s 
decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,2 two 
competing versions of the stream of commerce theory developed within 
the justices’ opinions. The first, expressed by Justice Brennan, suggested 
that foreseeability of a product causing injury in the forum is sufficient to 
create the necessary minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction.3 
The alternative theory endorsed by Justice O’Connor does not recognize 
minimum contacts unless there is some conduct by the defendant—in 
addition to placing the product in the stream of commerce—that is 
directed specifically at the forum.4 Neither version of the theory 
commanded a majority of the Court, which led to plurality opinions and 
subsequent confusion among lower courts about how to properly assess 
personal jurisdiction in stream of commerce situations. 
This Note seeks to examine this controversy in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the recent stream of commerce case, J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.5 After discussing the limited clarification that 
J. McIntyre offers regarding the limits of stream of commerce jurisdiction, 
the Note considers various approaches from the federal courts of appeals 
to examine how lower courts have applied the principles articulated by the 
Supreme Court. Finally, the Note suggests a guiding principle and a series 
 
 
 1. See William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 600 
(1993); Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 849, 850 (1989). 
 2. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 3. Id. at 117–18 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 4. Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 5. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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of rules that would create a more definite and predictable framework for 
determining whether stream of commerce personal jurisdiction exists. 
This Note argues that the jurisprudence surrounding J. McIntyre and 
Asahi largely conflates the doctrine of stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction with the types of proof sufficient to support such jurisdiction. 
Further, this Note contends that the focus when determining personal 
jurisdiction in a stream of commerce context should be on the intent of the 
defendant regarding the forum, which serves as a means of determining 
whether there is purposeful availment that creates the necessary minimum 
contacts between the forum and defendant. A series of concrete rules are 
proposed to give form to this principle. First, this proposed framework 
seeks to address possibly the most difficult issue in stream of commerce 
jurisdiction analysis—whether or not the use of a distributor by the 
defendant shields the defendant from personal jurisdiction. The proposed 
rule directly connects the intent of the defendant regarding the relevant 
forum with the issue of purposeful availment, such that if a defendant 
intends to market its product in the forum, that forum may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Second, this framework retains 
the currently accepted rule that non-sales conduct in a forum, such as 
advertising, may create personal jurisdiction in a forum regardless of the 
defendant’s intent when arranging distribution of its products. Third, 
purposeful availment of the national market constitutes purposeful 
availment of each state within the United States. Finally, this framework 
retains the independent reasonableness requirement, which serves largely 
as a safety valve for extreme situations in which the stream of commerce 
theory of personal jurisdiction creates jurisdiction in a manner that is 
fundamentally unfair to the defendant.  
II. HISTORY 
Early formulations of the standard for personal jurisdiction in the 
United States did not contemplate extraterritorial jurisdiction.6 In 
Pennoyer v. Neff,7 the Supreme Court definitively expressed the classic 
grounds for personal jurisdiction.8 In 1945, the Court expanded this 
 
 
 6. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1064 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 7. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 8. These grounds were consent to jurisdiction, presence in the forum, or domicile within the 
forum. Id.; see also 16 ROBERT C. CASAD, Pennoyer v. Neff Recognized Physical Power Theory and 
Enunciated Traditional Bases for Jurisdiction, in MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 108.20 (3d 
ed. 1997). 
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traditional view of personal jurisdiction with its decision of International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington9 by authorizing the exercise of extraterritorial 
personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in some circumstances.10 Such 
jurisdiction, however, must be premised upon the party’s exercise of the 
“privilege of conducting activities within a state. . . .”11 The exercise of 
such a privilege may give rise to personal jurisdiction so long as the 
party’s contacts with the forum are sufficient to make the existence of 
personal jurisdiction “reasonable and just according to our traditional 
conception of fair play and substantial justice.”12 In Hanson v. Denckla,13 
the Supreme Court further refined the International Shoe principles when 
it pronounced a new rule requiring “some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”14 in 
order for personal jurisdiction to exist in a forum. 
In 1980, the Supreme Court first considered what has become known 
as the stream of commerce theory as it applies to the concept of minimum 
contacts in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.15 The Court 
expressly stated that “[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under 
the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation 
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation 
that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”16 
The Court applied these principles directly to a stream of commerce 
scenario in Asahi, which considered whether the California courts had 
personal jurisdiction over a Japanese defendant in a cross-claim stemming 
from a product liability suit concerning an allegedly defective motorcycle 
tire.17 Although the Court directly considered whether the foreign 
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction based on a stream of 
commerce theory, the resulting opinion did not provide a reliable test for 
 
 
 9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 10. Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
 11. Id. at 319.  
 12. Id. at 320. See also WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 1067. 
 13. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 14. Id. at 253.  
 15. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). World-Wide Volkswagen was a products liability action filed in 
Oklahoma to recover for injuries sustained in a car accident in Oklahoma against the car retailer and 
wholesaler who were both New York corporations with no connections to Oklahoma. Id. at 288–90. 
Although the Court rejected Oklahoma’s jurisdiction over the New York defendants, it recognized the 
stream of commerce theory as a valid method for establishing minimum contacts. Id. at 297–98. 
 16. Id. (citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 
1961)).  
 17. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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the stream of commerce issue.18 In fact, many commentators have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Court’s handling of the issue.19 Lower 
courts were also frustrated by the lack of certainty that the Asahi plurality 
opinions created.20  
In 2011, the Court revisited the issue of stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro.21 Commentators 
expressed hope that the Court would provide more reliable guidance on 
these issues.22 These hopes were largely dashed, however, as the Court 
was again unable to produce a majority opinion.23  
III. ASAHI’S COMPETING RATIONALES 
In Asahi, the Court considered a products liability case in which the 
plaintiffs alleged that defective tires on a motorcycle caused a crash that 
injured the plaintiffs.24 Eventually, only a cross-claim between two foreign 
defendants, Asahi and Cheng Shin, remained.25 Asahi moved to quash 
Cheng Shin’s service on the grounds that California could not exert 
jurisdiction over Asahi within the boundaries of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.26  
 
 
 18. Kim Dayton, Personal Jurisdiction and the Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LITIG. 239, 278 
(1988).  
 19. See Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1071, 1076 (1994); Wendy C. Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. 
L. REV. 529, 529–31 (1991); Transgrud, supra note 1, at 850; Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, 
and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189–90 
(1998); Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-Buried Legacy, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 564 (1995).  
 20. See, e.g., Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co. Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(“Asahi does not provide clear guidance on the ‘minimum contacts’ prong, and therefore we will 
continue to follow the stream of commerce analysis in World-Wide Volkswagen.” (citation omitted)); 
Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting the lack of a 
clear standard in Asahi and the differing approaches that the circuit courts have taken to applying 
Asahi). 
 21. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
 22. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Berkelhammer, Supreme Court to Readdress Stream of Commerce 
Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 350, 351 (2011); WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 
§ 1067.4. 
 23. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the 
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245–46 (2011) (referring to the decision as a 
“disaster”).  
 24. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987).  
 25. One of the defendants in the action, Cheng Shin Rubber, manufactured the tires in Taiwan. 
Id. at 106. Cheng Shin brought a cross-claim against codefendant Asahi Metal Industry Co., which 
manufactured the tire’s valve stems in Japan, seeking indemnification. Id. All of the other claims in the 
action were eventually settled and dismissed, leaving only the indemnification claim between Cheng 
Shin and Asahi. Id. 
 26. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/7
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Although the Court unanimously held that the California courts did not 
have personal jurisdiction over Asahi, it could not produce a majority 
opinion.27 Opinions by Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan each won 
the support of four Justices. Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion.28  
A. Justice O’Connor’s Opinion 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justices Powell and Scalia, concluded that when a defendant places a 
product in the stream of commerce with the knowledge that the product 
will eventually end up in the forum state the action will not constitute 
minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum.29 O’Connor 
stressed that there must be “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant 
[indicating] an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.”30 
Such conduct must be directed at the market in the forum state.31  
Justice O’Connor’s opinion succinctly demonstrates the importance of 
purposeful availment to the stream of commerce theory. The 
“constitutional touchstone” of personal jurisdiction remains minimum 
contacts with the forum state.32 Further, such contacts arise from conduct 
in which the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State. . . .”33 Forum-directed 
conduct serves as Justice O’Connor’s method of determining whether the 
defendant has created minimum contacts through purposeful availment.34  
 
 
 27. Id. at 112–13 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). Note, however, that O’Connor’s opinion also 
argued that regardless of the issue of stream of commerce there would not be personal jurisdiction as it 
would be unreasonable under the circumstances of the case. “Considering the international context, the 
heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum State, the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this instance would be 
unreasonable and unfair.” Id. at 116. This is an independent reasonableness test, which must also be 
satisfied in order to establish personal jurisdiction. See infra note 207.  
 28. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 29. Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. (“Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the 
market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, 
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the 
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent 
in the forum State. But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the 
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into 
an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”).  
 32. Id. at 108 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33. Id. at 109 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 34. Id. at 112.  
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B. Justice Brennan’s Opinion 
Justice Brennan’s opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, Justice White, 
and Justice Blackmun, did not accept the need for additional conduct on 
the part of the defendant.35 He argued that the Court’s opinion in World-
Wide Volkswagen relied on foreseeability as a distinguishing characteristic 
between cases in which the Court found personal jurisdiction and others 
that lacked personal jurisdiction.36 Brennan argued further that a defendant 
that regularly and foreseeably sends its products into the forum state 
benefits indirectly from the forum’s laws that regulate commerce.37 
Finally, the Brennan opinion contended that where a defendant is aware 
that the final product is marketed in the forum, it cannot be surprised if it 
is subject to liability arising from a lawsuit in that forum.38 
Justice Brennan’s foreseeability standard, like Justice O’Connor’s 
forum-directed activity standard, relies on purposeful availment. For 
Justice Brennan, placing a product in the stream of commerce with the 
knowledge that it will be sold in the forum constitutes purposeful 
availment sufficient to create minimum contacts.39   
 
 
 35. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although 
Brennan rejected O’Connor’s stream of commerce analysis, he agreed with O’Connor’s finding that 
the circumstances of the Asahi case prevented the fair imposition of personal jurisdiction: “This is one 
of those rare cases in which ‘minimum requirements inherent in the concept of fair play and 
substantial justice . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has 
purposefully engaged in forum activities.’” Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78 (alteration in 
original)).  
 36. Id. at 120. 
 37. Id. at 117. 
 38. Id. (“The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the 
regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a 
participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the 
possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”).  
 39. Justice Brennan quoted World-Wide Volkswagen for the proposition that the relevant 
foreseeability is “that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he 
should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there.” Id. at 119 (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295) (internal quotation marks omitted). He continued 
incorporating the language of World-Wide Volkswagen by emphasizing that the forum State “does not 
exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation 
that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased 
by consumers in the forum State.” Id. at 119–20 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–
98) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Brennan’s emphasis on the defendant’s expectation that 
the product will be sold in the forum speaks to the defendant’s intent when it places a product in the 
stream of commerce. Thus, for Justice Brennan, foreseeability is a method of establishing purposeful 
availment that establishes minimum contacts. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/7
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C. Justice Stevens’s Opinion 
Justice Stevens argued that resolution of the stream of commerce issue 
was not required in Asahi because the exercise of jurisdiction would not be 
reasonable and fair.40 He then continued to weigh in on the stream of 
commerce issues. Stevens contended that whether a product’s foreseeable 
presence in the forum state amounted to minimum contacts was a function 
of “the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the 
components.”41 
IV. APPLICATION OF ASAHI IN LOWER COURTS 
The Asahi opinions created a difficult task for lower courts trying to 
apply the principles expressed by the Supreme Court.42 This led the lower 
courts to adopt differing methods for dealing with the issue of stream of 
commerce personal jurisdiction. Some courts returned to analyzing the 
cases under World-Wide Volkswagen and its more definite expression of 
the stream of commerce test.43 Other courts chose to apply the tests of both 
plurality decisions in Asahi.44 Multiple circuits adopted O’Connor’s 
stricter test for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction.45 The Brennan 
 
 
 40. Id. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 41. Id. at 122. 
 42. See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(characterizing the state of personal jurisdiction law as “unsettled”); Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & 
Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting the lack of clear guidance form Asahi and the 
divergent applications of it in circuit courts); Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 
25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that Asahi merely followed World-Wide Volkswagen and did 
not change the test for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction). 
 43. Barone, 25 F.3d at 614 (holding that Asahi did not alter the analysis under World-Wide 
Volkswagen because “Asahi stands for no more than that it is unreasonable to adjudicate third-party 
litigation between two foreign companies in this country absent consent by the nonresident 
defendant.”); Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d at 420 (“Asahi does not provide clear guidance on the 
‘minimum contacts’ prong, and therefore we will continue to follow the stream of commerce analysis 
in World-Wide Volkswagen.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Pennzoil, 149 F.3d at 207 (“[R]egardless of whether one applies the O’Connor 
standard or the Brennan standard, Colelli purposely availed itself of the laws of Pennsylvania . . . .”); 
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Although this case is being 
decided on the basis of the more permissive stream of commerce theory, in recognition of the recent 
split of Supreme Court authority on the issue, we also address Dehmlow’s contention that the facts of 
his case satisfy even the more stringent minimum contacts test set forth in Justice O’Connor’s plurality 
opinion in Asahi.”). 
 45. See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (adopting the O’Connor 
standard for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, 
Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 375–76 (8th Cir. 1990) (“appellees’ placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, does not constitute an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 
forum State.”); Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that for personal 
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position has also found support within several circuits.46 Finally, some 
opinions simply dodge the doctrinal question altogether and attempt to 
resolve the issue on a factual basis.47  
V. J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO 
Commentators heavily criticized the confusion surrounding the proper 
standard for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction after Asahi.48 Many 
expressed hope that the Supreme Court would rectify this lingering 
uncertainty when it accepted certiorari for J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 
Nicastro.49  
J. McIntyre involved a plaintiff who was injured while using a metal-
shearing machine manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.50 The 
injury occurred in New Jersey, but the machine was manufactured in 
England.51 Aside from the machine’s presence in New Jersey, the 
plaintiff’s factual basis for establishing personal jurisdiction rested on the 
defendant’s activities directed at the United States generally.52  
Again, as in Asahi, the Supreme Court was not able to articulate a 
definitive standard for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction and 
delivered a plurality opinion.53 Although the Court recognized the 
confused state of the law in this context and the opportunity to correct it,54 
it was unable to clarify the murky standard.  
 
 
jurisdiction to exist it must be foreseeable that “defendant’s own purposeful acts will have some effect 
in the forum.”).  
 46. See Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 385–86 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting the O’Connor standard and adopting the plurality position that no additional conduct was 
needed under the stream of commerce doctrine). 
 47. See Tobin v. Astra Pharmacetuical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 542–45 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding jurisdiction on the facts while not expressly adopting any of the Asahi positions on stream 
of commerce jurisdiction).  
 48. See supra note 18. 
 49. See supra note 22. 
 50. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 51. Id. 
 52. The plaintiff relied on three facts to supports its assertion of personal jurisdiction. First, an 
independent company had agreed to sell machines for J. McIntyre in the United States. Second, an 
official from J. McIntyre had come to the Untied States to advertise at conventions for the scrap 
recycling industry. Third, at least one machine, the machine that caused the injury, ended up in New 
Jersey. Id. However, the plurality rejected the plaintiff’s factual support for personal jurisdiction, 
noting that the plaintiff did not allege that J. McIntyre controlled its distributor in the United States, 
that none of the conventions attended by J. McIntyre officials were in New Jersey, and that the record 
suggested that only one machine ended up in New Jersey. Id. 
 53. Id. at 2785. 
 54. “The rules and standards for determining when a State does or does not have jurisdiction over 
an absent party have been unclear because of decades-old questions left open in Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Salano Cty.” Id. “This Court’s Asahi decision may be responsible in part 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/7
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A. Justice Kennedy’s Opinion 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, attempted to at least declare a winner between 
Asahi’s competing standards. The opinion argues that because Nicastro 
did not establish that J. McIntyre “engaged in conduct purposefully 
directed at New Jersey[,]” it did not meet the purposeful availment test.55 
This language clearly mirrors the standard proposed by O’Connor in 
Asahi.56 In fact, the plurality expressly follows the O’Connor standard 
instead of the Brennan standard for stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction.57  
However, the plurality does not simply adopt O’Connor’s Asahi 
standard by reference. Rather, it continues to argue that the directed-
conduct requirement derives from the necessity of consent by the 
defendant to suit in the forum.58 The opinion claims that “[t]he principal 
inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities manifest 
an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”59 Justice Kennedy 
 
 
for [the New Jersey Supreme Court’s] error regarding the stream of commerce, and this case presents 
an opportunity to provide greater clarity.” Id. at 2786. 
 55. Id. at 2784. 
 56. “The ‘substantial connection,’ between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a 
finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)) (internal citations omitted). 
 57. “But Justice Brennan’s concurrence, advocating a rule based on general notions of fairness 
and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.” J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2789. 
 58. Id. at 2787–88. 
 59. Id. at 2788. There has been debate about whether state sovereignty is a necessary component 
of personal jurisdiction determinations. See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 262–63 (1990) (discussing the importance of sovereignty to 
personal jurisdiction analysis); Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 5, 18–19 (1980) (arguing that state sovereignty creates constitutional limitations on the 
exercise of state court jurisdiction that could only be changed by constitutional amendment); John N. 
Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1065–66 (1983) 
(arguing that federalism concerns are minimal in personal jurisdiction and the modern theory of 
personal jurisdiction rightly emphasizes the personal rights of the parties). The dissent in J. McIntyre 
took issue with the plurality’s emphasis on sovereignty and pointed out that the Court has expressly 
held that personal jurisdiction is a function of due process, and not sovereignty concerns. Justice 
Ginsburg argued that:  
The restrictions on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. . . . 
must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due 
Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and 
the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. 
J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). But regardless of the theoretical basis for the personal jurisdiction requirement, it is clear that 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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argues that the requirement that a defendant “purposefully avai[l] itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws,”60 is equivalent to manifesting an 
intention to submit to the power of the forum state.61 Kennedy’s standard 
is more demanding than that of O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi 
because it seems to require directed activity that demonstrates consent 
rather than simply demonstrating fairness.62 Both the concurring and 
dissenting opinions in J. McIntyre perceived the more restrictive nature of 
the plurality’s framework and took issue with the expansion of the 
directed-conduct requirement.63 For the purposes of this discussion, the 
important point is that Justice Kennedy views purposeful availment as the 
means by which one may establish sufficient contacts to satisfy due 
process.64 
B. Justice Breyer’s Opinion 
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, argues that 
this case did not present the need to create any new expression of the 
requirements for stream of commerce personal jurisdiction65 and cautions 
the Court against making unnecessary changes to the rules of jurisdiction 
without a fuller understanding of the consequences of such a change.66 He 
points out that the plurality’s rule is not easily applicable to modern issues 
such as the use of the Internet in marketing and selling products.67 
 
 
minimum contacts that satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice created by 
purposeful availment of the forum by the defendant will satisfy the requirement. Therefore, despite the 
apparent tension in the opinions of J. McIntyre regarding this issue, the theoretical basis for the 
personal jurisdiction requirement does not change the analysis of whether certain conduct constitutes 
purposeful availment via the stream of commerce theory. 
 60. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
 61. See supra note 59. 
 62. See supra notes 29–31. 
 63. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 64. For all the complexity that has developed in this area of law, it is surprising how succinctly 
this central point may be made. Justice Kennedy states simply, “In products-liability cases like this 
one, it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. at 2787 (plurality opinion). 
 65. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 66. “I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the 
modern-day consequences.” Id. 
 67. Id. at 2793 (“The plurality seems to state strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant 
does not ‘inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign’ and cannot ‘be said to have targeted the 
forum.’ But what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from 
its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the 
products through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders? And 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/7
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However, while explaining that he also rejects the broad interpretation of 
stream of commerce jurisdiction advocated by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, Justice Breyer expresses a version of the O’Connor standard as his 
understanding of the current law.68 Like the plurality opinion, Justice 
Breyer’s opinion explicitly rejects the type of foreseeability test advocated 
by Justice Brennan in Asahi.69 It argues that a foreseeability test does not 
satisfy the requirement for minimum contacts and purposeful availment.70 
Thus, the opinion contends, a test based solely on foreseeability would 
abandon the currently accepted inquiry of whether, in light of the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum and the nature of the litigation, it is 
fair to subject the defendant to suit in the forum.71 Justice Breyer notes that 
while a foreseeability based rule might seem fair in the context of a large 
international firm such as J. McIntyre, the rule may be “fundamentally 
unfair” to smaller firms seeking to do business in the United States.72 He 
argues that such a test would create undue burdens on such companies.73  
C. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, 
rejects the plurality’s consent-based test as too restrictive.74 The dissent 
expresses particular concern about the ease with which a manufacturer 
might be able to avoid the majority of forums by simply designating a 
 
 
what if the company markets its products through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed 
in a forum? Those issues have serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in this case.” 
(alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)). 
 68. Id. at 2792. 
 69. “And the Court, in separate opinions, has strongly suggested that a single sale of a product in 
a State does not constitute an adequate basis for asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, 
even if that defendant places his goods in the stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such 
a sale will take place.” Id. 
 70. “I cannot reconcile so automatic a rule with the constitutional demand for ‘minimum 
contacts’ and ‘purposefu[l] avail[ment],’ each of which rest upon a particular notion of defendant-
focused fairness.” Id. at 2793 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 269) (alterations in 
original). 
 71. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793. 
 72. “It may be fundamentally unfair to require a small Egyptian shirt maker, a Brazilian 
manufacturing cooperative, or a Kenyan coffee farmer, selling its products through international 
distributors, to respond to products-liability tort suits in virtually every State in the United States, even 
those in respect to which the foreign firm has no connection at all but the sale of a single (allegedly 
defective) good.” Id. at 2794. 
 73. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“And a rule like the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests would 
require every product manufacturer, large or small, selling to American distributors to understand not 
only the tort law of every State, but also the wide variance in the way courts within different States 
apply that law.”). 
 74. Id. at 2798–99. 
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nation-wide “middleman” distributor, as J. McIntyre did in this case.75 
Justice Ginsburg argues that to allow such manufacturers to escape 
personal jurisdiction in much of the country, despite the fact that they are 
clearly marketing throughout the entire United States, would undermine 
the fairness of the judicial system.76 Finally, Justice Ginsburg suggests that 
the question of whether specific jurisdiction exists should be decided on 
the basis of “considerations of litigational convenience and the respective 
situations of the parties.”77  
D. Analysis 
Including both the plurality and concurring opinions, a majority of the 
Justices in J. McIntyre explicitly rejected the Brennan-type foreseeability 
test. Furthermore, the dissent’s stream of commerce jurisdiction analysis, 
although broader than the plurality’s, relies on “litigational convenience 
and the respective situations of the parties.”78 Thus, none of the opinions 
in J. McIntyre follow the foreseeability-based Brennan standard. Despite 
the lack of a majority holding, the opinions in J. McIntyre taken as a 
whole send a strong signal that Brennan’s foreseeability test as expressed 
in Asahi is no longer a viable theory upon which courts should decide 
issues of stream of commerce personal jurisdiction. Although some 
commentators have recently argued for the merits of Brennan’s 
 
 
 75. “[T]he splintered majority today ‘turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long-arm 
statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-
like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.’” Id. at 2795 (alterations 
in original) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U. C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 555 (1995)). 
 76. Id. at 2801–02 (“Courts, both state and federal, confronting facts similar to those here, have 
rightly rejected the conclusion that a manufacturer selling its products across the USA may evade 
jurisdiction in any and all States, including the State where its defective product is distributed and 
causes injury. They have held, instead, that it would undermine principles of fundamental fairness to 
insulate the foreign manufacturer from accountability in court at the place within the United States 
where the manufacturer’s products caused injury.”). 
 77. Id. at 2804 (“Litigational considerations include ‘the convenience of witnesses and the ease 
of ascertaining the governing law.’”) (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1168–69 (1966)); id. (“As to the parties, courts would 
differently appraise two situations: (1) cases involving a substantially local plaintiff, like Nicastro, 
injured by the activity of a defendant engaged in interstate or international trade; and (2) cases in 
which the defendant is a natural or legal person whose economic activities and legal involvements are 
largely home-based, i.e., entities without designs to gain substantial revenue from sales in distant 
markets.”) (citing von Mehren & Trautman, 79 HARV. L. REV. at 1167–69). 
 78. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804. 
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approach,79 the opinions in J. McIntyre are difficult to reconcile with a rule 
based on stream of commerce and foreseeability alone.  
Similarly, a majority of the Justices rejected the plurality’s more 
restrictive consent-based test.80 Seemingly, the Court has not materially 
changed the law of stream of commerce personal jurisdiction in any way. 
However, accepting the Court’s suggestion that, of the two standards 
expressed in Asahi, the O’Connor standard is favored,81 that standard 
seems to be a productive place to begin when seeking a plausible solution 
to the uncertainty surrounding this area of law.  
VI. THE IMPACT OF J. MCINTYRE 
Predictably, commentators have been unimpressed with the Supreme 
Court’s efforts in J. McIntyre. The Court in J. McIntyre largely 
disappointed those who had hoped for clarification of the law of stream of 
commerce personal jurisdiction.82 As an initial matter, the fact that, as in 
Asahi, the Court did not produce a majority opinion leaves an inherent 
uncertainty in how courts will apply the decision prospectively. 
Furthermore, most of the Justices subscribed to opinions that did not 
directly follow or build on the previous opinions in Asahi.83 
Justice Kennedy’s theory of stream of commerce personal jurisdiction 
represents a dramatic departure from the O’Connor standard expressed in 
Asahi. Kennedy grounds his opinion in the concept of the limited 
sovereignty of the states rather than a defendant-focused fairness 
 
 
 79. See, e.g., Matthew R. Huppert, Commercial Purpose as Constitutional Purpose: 
Reevaluating Asahi Through the Lens of International Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 624, 
669 (2011). 
 80. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2798–99. 
 81. Id. at 2789, 2792. 
 82. See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and 
McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH L. REV. 202, 224 (2011) (“Unfortunately, McIntyre not only fails to resolve 
the debate about the meaning of Asahi and the viability of a stream-of-commerce argument, it arguably 
will create further confusion among the already befuddled lower courts.”); Borchers, supra note 23, at 
1245–46 (“The Supreme Court performed miserably. Its opinion in J. McIntyre . . . is a disaster. As in 
its 1987 Asahi decision, the Court produced no majority opinion, but the plurality opinion attempted to 
roll back the clock by a century or more and re-ground personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty 
theory that the Court had apparently rejected several times before.”); Megan M. La Belle, The Future 
of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre v. 
Nicastro, 15 No. 7 J. INTERNET L. 3, 7 (2012) (“Unfortunately, Goodyear and McIntyre failed to 
resolve certain outstanding questions related to personal jurisdiction, such as the split in Asahi between 
Justices O’Connor and Brennan. Moreover, Goodyear and McIntyre raise a whole host of new issues 
about the future of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
 83. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion; id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 
2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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analysis.84 His theory equates purposeful availment with actual consent of 
the defendant to submit to the power of the sovereign.85 This formulation 
strangely resembles the sort of implied consent theory used to establish 
extraterritorial personal jurisdiction prior to International Shoe.86 As the J. 
McIntyre dissent noted, such analysis is an anachronism.87  
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, on the other hand, advocates a more open-
ended test based on “considerations of litigational convenience and the 
respective situations of the parties.”88 Such a standard does allow for a 
thorough investigation of the fairness and reasonableness of personal 
jurisdiction in each case, but lacks the predictability desired by courts and 
litigants. Each court would be left to judge the fairness of personal 
jurisdiction in each case without any rubric to guide the inquiry. Certainly 
there is precedent that courts might look to for past rulings on the fairness 
of personal jurisdiction in various situations, but the great diversity of 
factual scenarios that courts face will ensure that such precedent would 
rarely provide guidance that is directly on point with a pending case. Thus, 
there would be no reliable scheme to which potential defendants could 
look when ordering their affairs to be reasonably assured that they would 
or would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in a given forum.  
Although Kennedy’s and Ginsburg’s opinions interact with Asahi, they 
do not build on it. Rather, they attempt to extend or modify the law as it 
was expressed in Asahi.89 The result is further uncertainty about how to 
apply not only the multiple opinions expressed in Asahi, but also the 
competing rationales put forth by the court in J. McIntyre. Furthermore, 
the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre first introduced the concept of implied 
consent to the discussion, adding to the confusion that courts already face 
when navigating Asahi’s competing standards. Although these opinions 
recognize a need for something new in this area of law, they were unable 
to agree upon what that something should look like. 
 
 
 84. Id. at 2789–90 (plurality opinion). 
 85. Id. at 2788 (“The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is whether the defendant’s activities 
manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign. In other words, the defendant must 
‘purposefully avai[l] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’”) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1958)).  
 86. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (holding that a state statute that implied 
consent to suit in the state on the part of non-resident drivers who used the roads within the state was 
constitutional).  
 87. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 2804.  
 89. See supra notes 57–63, 74–77 and accompanying text.  
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Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion rejected other opinions’ attempts to 
modify the current law regarding stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction.90 Due to the nature of the question and the deficiency of the 
factual record, Breyer’s opinion advocated following precedent in the 
particular case of J. McIntyre.91 However, Breyer also recognized that 
existing law may not be particularly well-suited to deal with the modern 
realities of national and international trade.92 Despite the possible benefits 
of judicial restraint, Justice Breyer’s opinion is disappointing in that it 
does not confront the need for a more definite standard regarding stream of 
commerce. 
VII. CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY UNDER THE O’CONNOR STANDARD 
Even if one takes J. McIntyre to signal of full-scale adoption of the 
O’Connor standard,93 there are still many difficulties associated with 
stream of commerce jurisdictional analysis under that standard. The 
plurality opinion expressly recognized these difficulties.94 Even where 
courts have accepted that personal jurisdiction requires some additional 
forum-directed conduct on the part of the defendant, there is little 
consensus as to what will satisfy that requirement.  
There are categories of conduct that courts have widely accepted as 
establishing minimum contacts within the O’Connor standard. Classic 
examples of O’Connor’s directed activity include designing a product for 
a particular forum, advertising the product in the forum, and retaining a 
distributor to specifically serve the forum.95  
 
 
 90. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792–93 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Because the incident at issue in 
this case does not implicate modern concerns, and because the factual record leaves many open 
questions, this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic 
jurisdictional rules.”). 
 91. Id. at 2792. 
 92. Id. at 2791 (“I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in commerce and 
communication, many of which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not present 
any of those issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability without full 
consideration of the modern-day consequences.”). 
 93. In fact, only the concurring opinion advocates deciding these questions based on the standard 
put forward by Justice O’Connor in Asahi. Id.  
 94. Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (“The conclusion that the authority to subject a defendant to 
judgment depends on purposeful availment, consistent with Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi, does 
not by itself resolve many difficult questions of jurisdiction that will arise in particular cases. The 
defendant’s conduct and the economic realities of the market the defendant seeks to serve will differ 
across cases, and judicial exposition will, in common-law fashion, clarify the contours of that 
principle.”). 
 95. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion) (“Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
558 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:543 
 
 
 
 
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc.96 provides an example of a case that 
contained contacts clearly sufficient to satisfy the O’Connor standard. The 
suit was filed in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia for 
damages arising from an automobile accident.97 The defendants removed 
the suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia, relying on diversity jurisdiction.98 The foreign manufacturer 
defendant, a French state-owned company, moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.99 The district court granted the motion to dismiss, 
but the Eleventh Circuit reversed.100  
The court in Vermeulen, while noting the unsettled nature of the law 
regarding stream of commerce personal jurisdiction, determined that even 
under the most stringent standard expressed by the Supreme Court in 
Asahi, personal jurisdiction existed in this case.101 The court relied on 
multiple instances of the defendants’ conduct that fit within the examples 
O’Connor provided in her Asahi opinion.102 First, the court noted that the 
defendants had modified its vehicles “specifically to accommodate the 
American market.”103 Second, the court highlighted the fact that the 
 
 
in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in 
the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advise to customers in the forum State, or 
marketing the products through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum 
State.”).  
 96. 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 97. Id. at 1541. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1553. 
 101. Id. at 1548 (“As is evident from the foregoing discussion, the current state of the law 
regarding personal jurisdiction is unsettled. Because jurisdiction in the United States over RNUR in 
this case, however, is consistent with due process under the more stringent ‘stream of commerce plus’ 
analysis adopted by the Asahi plurality, we need not determine which standard actually controls this 
case.”).  
 102. It is interesting to note that this in some ways resembles one of the rare cases mentioned by 
the J.McIntyre plurality in which the United States is the sovereign that is relevant in determining if 
there are minimum contacts. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789–90 (2011) 
(plurality opinion). Although the J. McIntyre plurality discussed a situation where stream of commerce 
would support United States jurisdiction but not jurisdiction in any state and the jurisdiction in 
Vermeulen was statutorily based, the similarities are worth noting. Vermeulen, while presenting a 
different factual scenario, does offer an example of stream of commerce analysis with the United 
States as the relevant forum. The Vermeulen court premised jurisdiction on an exception to sovereign 
immunity provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 and, thus, independently federal. 
Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1543. This was the basis for determining minimum contacts vis-à-vis the 
United States as opposed to the State of Georgia. When determining jurisdiction in standard diversity-
based removal cases, courts apply the minimum contacts analysis with regard to the original forum 
state rather than the United States. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 673–74 (1st 
Cir. 1992). 
 103. Vermeulen, 985 F.2d. at 1549.  
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defendant advertised its products within the United States.104 Third, the 
court found that the defendants “established channels for providing regular 
advice to customers in the United States.”105 Finally, the court observed 
that the defendants “created and controlled the distribution network that 
brought its products into the United States.”106 The court found that these 
contacts were “sufficiently related to appellant’s cause of action to confer 
specific jurisdiction upon the United States.”107 The four contacts 
examined by the court match the examples given by Justice O’Connor in 
Asahi exactly.108 In such a case, there is little doubt that the defendant has 
purposefully availed itself of the forum; but most cases do not fit so neatly 
within O’Connor’s framework.  
At the other extreme, it is well established that simply selling a product 
to a distributor that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known 
would distribute the product in the forum will not support the existence of 
personal jurisdiction.109 In Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc.,110 the First 
Circuit considered whether it had jurisdiction over a defendant corporation 
from a foreign state where the defendant’s only contact with the forum 
was that a national distributor had allegedly sold the defendant’s product 
in the forum.111 The court held that such an isolated contact with the forum 
did not support personal jurisdiction because the defendant had not 
directed any conduct specifically at the forum state.112  
Similarly, Falkirk Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd.113 involved a suit in 
North Dakota for damages arising from an allegedly defective cam 
manufactured by a Japanese company.114 Again, the sole contact between 
the defendant and the forum state was that its product had been sold to the 
plaintiff in the forum through an independent distributor.115 The Eighth 
 
 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1550. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion). 
 109. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 673–74, 683 (1st Cir. 1992); Falkirk 
Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 110. Boit, 967 F.2d at 673–74. 
 111. Id. at 671.  
 112. Id. at 683 (“There is no evidence in the record that Gar-Tec intended to serve the market in 
Maine. For example, there is no evidence that Gar-Tec designed the product for Maine, advertised in 
Maine, established channels for providing regular advice to customers in Maine, or marketed the 
product through a distributor who had agreed to serve as a sales agent in Maine.”). 
 113. 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 114. Id. at 371–72.  
 115. Id. at 375. 
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Circuit held that this was insufficient grounds to establish the existence of 
personal jurisdiction.116 The court reasoned that “[l]ike the nonresident 
defendant in Asahi, appellees’ placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, does not constitute an act of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”117 
Between the two extremes represented by the foregoing cases, there 
remains great confusion about what constitutes purposeful availment when 
applying the O’Connor standard for stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction. Two areas where this confusion is particularly pronounced 
are: the limits of the rule that a distributor insulates a defendant from suit 
in a given forum and cases involving activity that is directed to the United 
States as a whole. The following section will examine representative cases 
for each of these scenarios in order to more fully understand the 
difficulties that they present to a court in conducting a stream of commerce 
personal jurisdiction analysis.  
VIII. THE LIMITS OF THE INSULATING EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTORS 
One of the most common obstacles faced by plaintiffs attempting to 
establish a court’s personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant is that the 
product entered the forum through a distributor. Often, courts see the 
distributor as an independent actor who brings the product into the forum 
without the participation of the defendant manufacturer.118 However, 
courts have also crafted exceptions to this general rule.  
One such exception stems from contact with end-user customers within 
the forum. In Pennzoil Products Co. v. Colelli & Associates, Inc.,119 the 
defendant sold allegedly defective solvents to a distributor who then sold 
them to the plaintiff.120 However, in this case, unlike many cases involving 
distributors, the court determined that the manufacturer did have minimum 
contacts with the forum.121 The Third Circuit based their finding of 
minimum contacts on the fact that the defendant interacted with the 
plaintiff.122 These interactions, the court held, demonstrated an intent to 
 
 
 116. “Unless it can be shown that appellees purposefully directed their activities toward North 
Dakota, the mere fact that Marion brought two of the cams it purchased from Japan Steel into North 
Dakota does not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellees.” Id. at 375–76. 
 117. Id. at 376.  
 118. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992).  
 119. 149 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 120. Id. at 199–200. 
 121. Id. at 207.  
 122. Id. at 206 (“Colelli’s actions clearly conformed to Justice O’Connor’s definition of 
‘additional conduct.’ Sending solvent samples to Pennzoil’s laboratories demonstrated an intent to 
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design the product for the forum and the establishment of channels for 
providing advice to customers in the forum.123 Thus, “Colelli’s actions 
clearly conformed to Justice O’Connor’s definition of ‘additional 
conduct.’”124 These minimum contacts were present despite the fact that 
the defendant utilized a distributor and did not directly sell the products in 
the forum.125 
Pennzoil stands in contrast to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Seiferth v. 
Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc.126 Seiferth was an action brought by the estate 
of a worker who died when a platform on a helicopter designed by one of 
the defendants broke.127 Although the designer of the platform transported 
the platform to the forum state and inspected the platform,128 the court held 
that his contacts were not sufficiently related to the cause of action to 
establish personal jurisdiction over a defective-design claim.129 The court 
reasoned that licensing a design was not the same as placing a product in 
the stream of commerce.130 The court, however, did hold that there was 
personal jurisdiction for negligence-based claims against the designer that 
related to his actual conduct within the forum.131  
In contrast to the Third Circuit’s analysis in Pennzoil,132 the Fifth 
Circuit in Seiferth was unwilling to attach jurisdictional significance to the 
defendant’s direct contact with the customer in the forum, which involved 
the very product that gave rise to the cause of action. Like the defendant in 
Pennzoil, the designer in Seiferth did not directly sell its product to the 
plaintiff but did work with the customer to encourage the purchase and use 
 
 
‘design’ a product which could be used to serve the Pennsylvania refinery market. Furthermore, the 
record indicates that Cam Colelli had a number of telephone conversations with lab personnel at 
Pennzoil’s refinery to discuss testing procedures and methodology. Thus, Cam Colelli had established 
‘channels for providing regular advice to’ Pennzoil’s personnel in Pennsylvania.”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. “Although Pennzoil was not technically a ‘customer’ of Colelli’s (since Colelli did not sell 
solvents directly to Pennzoil), Colelli was obviously motivated by the fact that Pennzoil operated one 
of the two major refineries in the state to which the Ohio producers sent sixty percent of their crude 
oil.” Id. at 206–07. 
 126. 472 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 127. Id. at 269–70. 
 128. Id. at 269. 
 129. Id. at 275. 
 130. “The stream-of-commerce theory does not provide a basis for jurisdiction, because Camus 
did not place a product into the stream, but merely licensed a design to Air 2.” Id. 
 131. “Camus transported the work platform to Mississippi and inspected it there. . . . This is 
sufficient to find that the claims of failure to warn, negligence, and negligence per se arise out of 
Camus’s Mississippi contacts.” Id. at 276. 
 132. Pennzoil, 149 F.3d at 206–07. 
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of the product.133 The Fifth Circuit found that the stream of commerce 
theory was not applicable because the designer had merely licensed the 
design to the company that sold the platform to the plaintiff.134 The 
importance of this distinction is not readily apparent. The application of 
the stream of commerce theory has not been limited only to products 
liability cases.135 Furthermore, products liability cases are often based 
upon allegations of defective design, and it seems formalistic to recognize 
a rule that stream of commerce personal jurisdiction may only apply in 
those cases where the designer and manufacturer are the same entity. 
Using the principles applied by the Third Circuit in Pennzoil, one can 
make a strong case that the designer’s conduct in Seiferth indicated that he 
was designing the product for use by a specific customer in the forum 
market. 
Perhaps the Fifth Circuit was persuaded by the more isolated nature of 
the transaction in Seiferth. The designer seemingly only had contact with 
the plaintiffs in the forum regarding the platform.136 The defendant in 
Pennzoil, by contrast, was designing its product for a continuing and 
significant market represented by the plaintiff.137 This line of reasoning, 
however, ignores the fact that some industries are geared toward a small 
number of transactions. It seems unrealistic to think that a defendant who 
is a helicopter platform designer must have extensive contacts regarding 
its design in the forum in order to establish extra-territorial personal 
jurisdiction. It is very unlikely that such a defendant would have more than 
a handful of contacts in any given forum because of the limited market for 
helicopter platforms. This situation mirrors that of J. McIntyre in that the 
defendant sold a small number of relatively large and expensive machines 
for which there would not be a large market.138 Such a basis for treating 
defendants in these industries differently rests on formalistic notions of the 
stream of commerce connections rather than on the underlying fairness of 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.  
More importantly, these cases demonstrate the difficulty faced by 
courts and potential defendants trying to discern a consistent and reliable 
standard from these precedents. Courts recognize that the use of a 
distributor alone will not shield a defendant from suit in the forum where 
 
 
 133. See id. 
 134. Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 275. 
 135. See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying the 
stream of commerce theory to licensed software). 
 136. Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 269–70. 
 137. Pennzoil, 149 F.3d at 206–07. 
 138. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
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the defendant has other contact with the forum. It is not clear, however, 
what type and amount of conduct is necessary to overcome the insulating 
effect of a distributor.  
IX. NATIONALLY DIRECTED CONDUCT 
Often, conduct by a defendant will be directed at the United States 
generally rather than at any specific state. The distinctions between 
markets within the individual states of the United States are often not 
important to a manufacturer. Despite this commercial reality, the evolution 
of the stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction has made state 
boundaries important.139 There is concern by some, including the dissent 
in J.McIntyre, that companies may take advantage of courts’ state-by-state 
stream of commerce personal jurisdiction analysis to avoid suit by 
generalizing their contacts with the United States to limit the forums in 
which they may be sued.140  
The Sixth Circuit, in Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.,141 
faced such a circumstance. The case involved a products liability action 
against a foreign manufacturer of pharmaceuticals.142 After originally 
being haled into state court, the defendants removed the case to federal 
district court, where the case was dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.143 The court of appeals reversed, finding personal jurisdiction 
under a stream of commerce theory.144 
The Tobin court examined the nationally directed conduct of the 
defendant while considering whether purposeful availment existed.145 The 
court held that the defendant had availed itself of all of the states in the 
 
 
 139. See id. at 2789–90. 
 140. Justice Ginsburg specifically refers to this situation. She asks rhetorically whether a foreign 
industrialist that is indifferent as to where its product sells within the United States but wants to avoid 
products-liability litigation may escape personal liability by engaging a distributor to ship its machines 
into the United States: 
Under this Court’s pathmaking precedent in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and 
subsequent decisions, one would expect the answer to be unequivocally, “No.” But instead, 
six Justices of this Court, in divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has avoided the 
jurisdiction of our state courts, except perhaps in States where its products are sold in sizable 
quantities.  
Id. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 141. 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 142. Id. at 532. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 544–45. 
 145. Id. at 544. 
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union by seeking to service markets within the entire United States.146 
Important to the court’s reasoning was the fact that the defendant 
maintained some element of control over the United States distributor’s 
compliance with all applicable FDA regulations and information 
submitted to the FDA.147 This requirement also granted the defendant 
control over the wording of the information included with the medicine, as 
it had to be FDA approved.148 The opinion stressed that seeking FDA 
approval was a directed effort to gain access to all states in the United 
States.149 Furthermore, the court argued that by engaging a nationwide 
distributor, the defendant had availed itself of all of the states.150  
This analysis stands in stark contrast to the state-specific analysis 
expressed by the plurality in J. McIntyre.151 There the plurality focused 
only on the defendant’s activity that was specifically directed at the forum 
state.152 The Court in J. McIntyre specifically distinguished the United 
States as a separate sovereign that must be considered apart from the 
individual states when determining personal jurisdiction.153 In Tobin, on 
the other hand, the Sixth Circuit determined that actions taken toward the 
United States generally could establish minimum contacts in all states, 
despite a lack of forum-specific directed activity.154  
J. McIntyre did not resolve this interpretive fork in the road, given the 
Court’s plurality opinion and the plaintiff’s failure to argue the 
 
 
 146. Id. (“Duphar was not simply placing its product into the stream of commerce. Duphar 
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in all states, including the state of 
Kentucky. As we have stated many times before, ‘[p]urposeful availment by the defendant of the 
privilege of acting in, or causing consequences in, the forum state ‘is the sine qua non of in personam 
jurisdiction.’”) (alterations in original). 
 147. “Duphar intended to keep tight control over the information given to the FDA and over any 
changes in the wording of the package insert.” Id. at 543. 
 148. Id. 
 149. “Duphar maintains that FDA approval was merely a prerequisite for placing the product into 
the stream of commerce. Duphar confuses the stream of commerce concept. Duphar’s direct efforts in 
obtaining FDA approval allowed Duphar to avail itself of the vast, lucrative markets of each state in 
the United States.” Id. 
 150. Id. at 543–44 (“Duphar made a deliberate decision to market ritodrine in all 50 states, 
including Kentucky, the forum state. . . . Duphar did not, for example, seek a ‘New England regional 
distributor’ or a distributor for specific states. It sought and obtained a distributor to market its product 
in each and every state.”). 
 151. J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (plurality opinion). 
 152. Id. (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. 
The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the society or 
economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to 
subject the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”). 
 153. “Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not any particular State.” Id. 
 154. Tobin, 993 F.2d at 543–44. 
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defendant’s nationwide contacts. Although some may find comfort in the 
doctrinal simplicity of the plurality’s analysis, the standard expressed by 
the plurality does create the possibility for safe harbors that foreign 
manufacturers may resort to in order to avoid suit within the United States. 
The dissent in J. McIntyre recognized this problem.155 In many cases, 
especially those with foreign defendants, this result could bar plaintiffs 
from bringing their suit entirely because of the extra cost and difficulty 
associated with pursuing their claim in the defendant’s home country.  
The alternative position also has a strong point, in that the imposition 
of an easy standard for directed activity would impose burdens on small 
manufacturers who simply sell their products to a distributor. The Sixth 
Circuit in Tobin focused on the defendant’s efforts to obtain FDA approval 
and to engage a distributor that would serve the entire United States.156 In 
such a circumstance, the imposition of jurisdiction hardly poses an undue 
burden on the manufacturer. When a manufacturer makes a large-scale 
intentional effort to gain entry into the national U.S. market, efforts to 
distinguish between activities directed at any specific state would be 
artificial and unnecessarily formalistic. However, as Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in J. McIntyre recognized, the large scale of some 
operations could mask the difficulties that smaller manufacturers would 
face under a lower standard for directed activity.157 
X. PROPOSAL 
Given the great diversity in rationales and interpretations that the 
United States Courts of Appeals have applied to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions relating to stream of commerce theory of personal jurisdiction, 
 
 
 155. The dissent notes that a foreign manufacturer seeking to take advantage of the market in the 
United States, but would prefer to avoid products liability litigation there, might engage a U.S. 
distributor to that end. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794–95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg 
argues that under current precedent, this arrangement would not allow the manufacturer to avoid suit, 
but that “six Justices of this Court, in divergent opinions, tell us that the manufacturer has avoided the 
jurisdiction of our state courts, except perhaps in States where its products are sold in sizeable 
quantities.” Id. at 2795. This decision, she argues, “turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern 
long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a user is injured, need 
only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.” Id. (quoting 
Weintraub, supra note 75, at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. See Tobin, 993 F.2d at 543. 
 157. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“What might appear fair in the case 
of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its 
product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of a small manufacturer (say, an Appalachian 
potter) who sells his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, who resells a single 
item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant State (Hawaii).”). 
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there is a clear need for a more definite standard. As personal jurisdiction 
is rooted in the constitutional guarantees of due process,158 the rules 
controlling whether jurisdiction exists should be applied uniformly 
throughout the country. “The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly 
administration of the laws,’ gives a degree of predictability to the legal 
system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct 
with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not 
render them liable to suit.”159 Unfortunately, the jurisprudence relating to 
stream of commerce personal jurisdiction has not lived up to this standard. 
This section offers a guiding principle that seeks to simplify stream of 
commerce personal jurisdiction as well as a series of proposed rules to 
provide concrete examples of the principle in action. 
A. Refocusing on Purpose and Intent 
Purposeful availment is the cornerstone of the stream of commerce 
theory of personal jurisdiction.160 Despite the confusing and contentious 
nature of the various opinions in both Asahi and J. McIntyre, all of those 
opinions accept that purposeful availment is necessary to satisfy 
International Shoe’s minimum contacts test in the stream of commerce 
context.161 The central importance of purposeful availment began with the 
Court’s pronouncement in Hanson that purposeful availment of the laws 
of the forum state is a necessary component to the exercise of 
extraterritorial personal jurisdiction.162 All the opinions in Asahi accepted 
purposeful availment as the element of personal jurisdiction that the 
stream of commerce theory addresses. Justice O’Connor argued that 
purposeful availment must arise from the defendant’s actions that create a 
 
 
 158. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
 159. Id. at 297 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 160. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (“In products-liability cases like this 
one, it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (“When a 
corporation ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,’ 
it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there . . . .”) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 
(1927)) (internal citation omitted); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“The ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the 
forum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 161. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105; id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 119 (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality 
opinion). 
 162. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2012] PURPOSE AND INTENT 567 
 
 
 
 
substantial connection with the forum state.163 Justice Brennan’s analysis 
found purposeful availment of the forum’s laws when the defendant had 
placed the product in the stream of commerce with the knowledge that it 
will arrive in the forum state.164 Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion 
argued that whether a defendant had purposefully availed itself of the 
forum is “a constitutional determination that is affected by the volume, the 
value, and the hazardous character of the components.”165 Despite the 
differing rationale expressed in the case, the central question in each 
opinion is whether the defendant’s conduct constituted purposeful 
availment of the benefits and protections of the forum.  
Similarly, all the opinions in J. McIntyre rely on purposeful availment 
as the central question in the stream of commerce personal jurisdiction 
analysis. With Justice Kennedy’s consent-based test for stream of 
commerce jurisdiction, purposeful availment acts as the means by which a 
defendant submits to the power of the sovereign.166 Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion largely follows Justice O’Connor’s rationale from 
Asahi, finding the issue of purposeful availment through directed activities 
to be the determinative factor for whether jurisdiction existed.167 Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent also gave importance to the issue of purposeful 
availment. She argued that because J. McIntyre had availed itself of the 
 
 
 163. O’Connor first noted that the Court had reaffirmed Hanson’s purposeful availment 
requirement in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, which held that “minimum contacts must have a basis 
in ‘some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109 
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 
(1985)). Purposeful availment exists when such availment creates contacts that “proximately result 
from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” Id. 
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). What O’Connor advocates in Asahi is that the substantial 
connection between the defendant and the forum State “must come about by an action of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.  
 164. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“A defendant 
who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final 
product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate 
commercial activity. These benefits accrue regardless of whether that participant directly conducts 
business in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct directed toward that State.”).  
 165. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 166. “As a general rule, the sovereign’s exercise of power requires some act by which the 
defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’” J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 167. Breyer argues that the plaintiff had not met his burden of establishing a factual basis for 
personal jurisdiction. He found that the plaintiff had not “shown that the British Manufacturer 
‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities’ within New Jersey, or that it 
delivered its goods in the stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be purchased’ by 
New Jersey users.” Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 297–98 (1980)).  
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entire United States market, it had availed itself of each individual State’s 
market, as well.168  
The wide acceptance of the importance of the purposeful availment 
requirement in these cases indicate its central role in the stream of 
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction. It is through such purposeful 
availment that the defendant creates the necessary minimum contacts to 
support extraterritorial personal jurisdiction.169  
Purposeful availment speaks to intent. When a manufacturer’s product 
is sold in a forum, the manufacturer has in some sense indirectly availed 
itself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum.170 Yet, the 
minimum contacts test of International Shoe requires more. Without 
requiring purpose or intent on the part of the manufacturer, a defendant 
could be called into court in any state where its product happened to cause 
an injury. World-Wide Volkswagen recognized the unfairness of subjecting 
a defendant to jurisdiction based upon the actions of other actors.171 If the 
defendant intended to access the markets in a particular forum, however, 
contacts are created that “proximately result from actions by the defendant 
himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.”172 
It has not been controversial that stream of commerce jurisdiction 
requires some form of intent on the part of the defendant to access the 
market in the forum. In one sense, the law of stream of commerce 
jurisdiction is relatively simple; it requires purposeful availment, which in 
turn requires intent on the part of the defendant to access the market in the 
forum. Confusion arises when courts attempt to determine which facts 
demonstrate such intent. Justice O’Connor distilled intent from a 
defendant’s additional activities directed specifically at the forum.173 
 
 
 168. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In sum, McIntyre UK, by 
engaging McIntyre America to promote and sell its machines in the United States, ‘purposefully 
availed itself’ of the United States market nationwide, not a market in a single State or a discrete 
collection of States. McIntyre UK thereby availed itself of the market of all States in which its 
products were sold by its exclusive distributor.”). 
 169. “[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 
319 (1945)). 
 170. It was this indirect availment of the forum’s laws that Justice Brennan relied upon in his 
Asahi opinion. He argued that a manufacturer that places a product into the stream of commerce 
“indirectly benefits from the State’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity.” Asahi, 480 
U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 171. In fact, the court rejected such a basis for jurisdiction, even when it is foreseeable by the 
defendant that the customer would likely take the product into another state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 
444 U.S. at 296–97.  
 172. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). 
 173. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108–12 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
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Justice Brennan was satisfied with foreseeability as a measure of intent.174 
Later, in J. McIntyre, Justice Kennedy required conduct purposefully 
directed at the forum.175 Justice Breyer’s opinion sought similar directed 
conduct.176 Even Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which focused on litigational 
considerations,177 discussed the intent of the defendant to access the 
United States as a single market.178 
Ultimately, then, what the Justices have had such a difficult time 
agreeing on is the manner of proof sufficient to demonstrate the 
defendant’s intent to access the market as a means of establishing 
purposeful availment. As the Court described in Hanson, the standard for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is purposeful availment that creates minimum 
contacts with the forum that satisfy traditional conceptions of fair play and 
substantial justice.179 Neither Asahi nor J. McIntyre has changed this 
standard.180 The relevant question, then, is simply whether the defendant 
has manifested intent to purposefully avail itself of the forum market. 
Despite the simplicity of the question, courts have had difficulty 
answering it consistently. Much of the problem has been that, as discussed 
above, the Justices have focused on issues of proof rather than the doctrine 
itself. While it is necessary when establishing stream of commerce 
personal jurisdiction to prove facts that support a finding that the 
defendant intended to avail itself of the forum market, such a finding is 
inherently discretionary. In Asahi, Justice Brennan was satisfied with 
foreseeability as a proxy for intent,181 while Justice O’Connor required 
some additional conduct.182 
If J. McIntyre has clarified anything, it is that the Court now accepts 
Justice O’Connor’s position in this controversy.183 But, the more important 
point is that underlying the decisions in both Asahi and J. McIntyre is the 
notion that the plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to access 
the forum market. It is this central question that is at the root of stream of 
commerce personal jurisdiction. While proof of such intent will vary from 
 
 
 174. See id. at 117, 120 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 175. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion). 
 176. See id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 177. See id. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 178. See id. at 2801–02. 
 179. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 180. See, e.g., Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
 181. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116–17 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 182. See id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 183. See supra Part V.D.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
570 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:543 
 
 
 
 
case to case,184 courts and litigators should recognize that Justice 
O’Connor’s forum-directed activity is a means to an end: it serves to show 
intent in support of a finding of purposeful availment.185 Foreseeability 
may not be sufficient to demonstrate such intent, but the proof required in 
Justice O’Connor’s standard is not limited to the narrow categories of 
conduct suggested in Asahi.186 Rather, Justice O’Connor’s opinion simply 
requires that the connection between the defendant and the forum State to 
“come about by an action of the defendant purposefully direction toward 
the forum state.”187 
Thinking about the forum-directed conduct requirement in this way 
allows for less complex rules relating to the standard for purposeful 
availment. This simplicity is achieved by keeping in mind that the 
question to be answered is whether the defendant intended to access the 
forum market and that evidence of such intent is not limited to the 
categories enumerated in Asahi. Such intent establishes a purpose on the 
part of the defendant to avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.188 This conception of the forum-directed conduct standard allows 
courts to apply stream of commerce personal jurisdiction in cases where 
there is intent to access the markets without the classic forum-directed 
conduct enumerated by Justice O’Connor in Asahi, while at the same time 
protecting defendants’ constitutional due process rights where there is no 
purposeful availment of the forum state. 
B. Proposed Rules 
In order to make sense of the Supreme Court’s stream of commerce 
jurisprudence, lower courts should refocus on the central requirement that 
plaintiffs demonstrate a defendant’s intent to access the forum market. As 
discussed above, this principle is consistent with Asahi and J. McIntyre, 
but the application of such a principle remains to be determined. The rules 
suggested below seek to give concrete form to this principle in a manner 
that creates predictable results for determining whether personal 
jurisdiction exists under the stream of commerce theory. 
 
 
 184. Justice O’Connor did enumerate certain examples of conduct that would satisfy the 
purposeful availment requirement, but this list was not intended to be exclusive. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 
112. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
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1. Distributors 
The commercial practice of distributing one’s goods into the various 
markets in the United States using a third-party distributor is at the heart of 
the stream of commerce issue. If a defendant in a product liability suit or 
its agent sold a product directly in the forum that later causes an injury, 
there would be little need for the stream of commerce theory. As many of 
the cases cited above reveal, however, an independent distributor often 
shields a manufacturer from personal jurisdiction despite clear intent to 
market its product within the forum.189 
The varying size of potential defendants is an important consideration 
in the Supreme Court’s opinions discussing this issue. The concurring 
opinion in J. McIntyre expresses the concern that an easy standard for 
stream of commerce personal jurisdiction would place an unfair burden on 
smaller commercial enterprises.190 The concern is that a small 
manufacturer might sell its product to an independent distributor, retaining 
no control over the distribution of the product, and still be called into court 
in a distant and unfamiliar forum.191 Most of the Justices in J. McIntyre 
seem to agree that personal jurisdiction over a very small manufacturer in 
a distant forum based solely on such foreseeability is fundamentally 
unfair.192 
The plight of the small manufacturer imagined by the Justices, 
however, is a simplified scenario constructed to demonstrate the unwanted 
effects a simple foreseeability test for stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction could have on smaller businesses. In reality, there are 
defendants of all sizes and levels of sophistication. Personal jurisdiction 
over a large multi-national manufacturer that has employed an 
independent distributor in order to sell its product within the forum does 
 
 
 189. See, e.g., Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992); Falkirk Mining 
Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369, 371–76 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 190. See J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 480 U.S. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Both the plurality opinion and the concurring opinion cite this scenario as a major failing of 
the Brennan-type foreseeability test. See supra 157; J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (“It must be 
remembered, however, that although this case and Asahi both involve foreign manufacturers, the 
undesirable consequences of Justice Brennan’s approach are no less significant for domestic 
producers. The owner of a small Florida farm might sell crops to a large nearby distributor, for 
example, who might then distribute them to grocers across the country. If foreseeability were the 
controlling criterion, the farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of other States’ courts without 
ever leaving town.”).  
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not raise the same issues of fairness.193 Thus, the distinction seems to arise 
from differing levels of resources and sophistication between large and 
small enterprises. However, these differences are based on generalities. 
There is no inherent reason that a small business would possess a less 
sophisticated distribution scheme than a larger business. Although 
resources and scale may be factors in such a scheme, a small business is 
still capable of seeking out and employing a distributor in order to widen 
its market exposure. 
Whether distributors create a barrier between a manufacturer and the 
personal jurisdiction in the forum should depend on the relationship 
between the distributor and the manufacturer. Purposeful availment relates 
to the intent of the defendant, and it is that intent that should control these 
disputes.194 When a manufacturer engages a distributor with the intent to 
access a specific market, there is purposeful availment of the market’s 
forum. 
Intent is a factual question, and it is the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden to 
establish this fact in support of its assertion of the forum’s jurisdiction. 
There are obvious scenarios in which this burden would be difficult to 
meet because of the abstract nature of the concept of intent. However, 
proof of intent would often be available in the form of distribution 
contracts, records of negotiations, patterns in business practice, and 
records relating to distribution planning.  
 
 
 193. E.g., “What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer which specifically seeks, or 
expects, an equal-sized distributor to sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case of 
a small manufacturer . . .” J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793.  
 194. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (“[I]f the sale of a 
product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the 
efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its products in 
other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective 
merchandise has there been the source of injury . . . .”). Although the Court spoke of isolated 
occurrences, it seems that the efforts of the defendant rather than the scope of its operation is the 
important factor. Isolated occurrence may refer to the type of after-market activities at issue in World-
Wide Volkswagen, which could bring a product into the forum without any effort or intent by the 
defendant. This interpretation is further supported by the Court’s broader formulation of the stream of 
commerce theory that immediately followed the previous quote: “The forum State does not exceed its 
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers 
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers in the forum State.” Id. at 297–98. Furthermore, the Court’s reliance on the defendant’s 
expectations rather than what was foreseeable to the defendant supports the contention that intent is the 
determinative factor. 
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2. Direct Non-Sales Contacts with the Forum 
Using only the foregoing framework for determining whether stream of 
commerce personal jurisdiction exists when a distributor is involved, one 
can envision a scheme that would enable manufacturers to avoid personal 
jurisdiction. A manufacturer could simply employ distributors with the 
capability to distribute anywhere the manufacturer might want to market 
its goods but retain no control and secure no representations by the 
distributor as to where the goods would actually be dissiminated. 
Furthermore, the manufacturer could promote the product actively in 
desirable markets in order to increase demand and influence the distributor 
to market the product in that forum. In fact, the distribution scheme used 
by J. McIntyre was very similar to this scenario. The company used a 
closely related but separate corporation called McIntyre America to 
distribute its products nationwide.195 This scheme allows the manufacturer 
to escape jurisdiction when it clearly manifestes intent to serve the forum 
market. 
In such a situation, Justice O’Connor’s forum-directed activity standard 
still applies independently of the distributor framework discussed above. 
As O’Connor recognized in Asahi, when a manufacturer directly designs, 
promotes, or tests a product for a specific market, purposeful availment is 
satisfied.196 These types of contacts demonstrate the manufacturer’s intent 
to avail itself of the forum.197 
3. National Availment 
The issue of national availment is perhaps the most troubling under the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction as expressed in J. McIntyre and Asahi. Following the plurality 
and concurrence in J. McIntyre, it seems that a defendant may avoid 
personal jurisdiction in a forum by arranging for a distributor to sell its 
product throughout the United States, rather than in specific states.198 The 
 
 
 195. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 196. Asahi Metal Indus. Corp. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
plurality opinion). 
 197. Id.  
 198. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (plurality opinion) (finding that despite the employment of a 
distributor for the United States market, the plaintiff did “not show that J. McIntyre purposefully 
availed itself of the New Jersey Market.”); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Here, the relevant 
facts found by the New Jersey Supreme Court show no ‘regular . . . flow’ or ‘regular course’ of sales 
in New Jersey; and there is no ‘something more,’ such as a special state-related design, advertising, 
advice, marketing, or anything else.”) (alterations in original). 
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plurality in J. McIntyre accepted this result as a function of the federal 
structure of the United States.199 The opinion asserted that if a defendant 
directed its conduct nationally, it would constitute purposeful availment 
that could create minimum contacts with the United States but not the 
individual states within the United States.200 The dissent in J. McIntyre 
rejected the proposition that directing activity to the entire nation does not 
constitute minimum contacts in the individual states.201 Justice Ginsburg 
argued that such a nationwide exposure to personal jurisdiction was 
consistent with the purposeful availment requirement.202 
The J. McIntyre plurality’s result is at odds with the purposeful 
availment standard, which links the manufacturer’s intent with the 
imposition of personal jurisdiction.203 As the J. McIntyre dissent 
recognized,204 if a manufacturer employs a distributor to serve the entire 
United States, it demonstrates a clear intent to avail itself of the markets in 
each state within the United States.205 Accordingly, when a defendant has 
placed its product in the stream of commerce with the intent that it be sold 
throughout the United States and without distinction between any of the 
individual states, each state may exercise personal jurisdiction over that 
 
 
 199. Id. at 2789 (plurality opinion). 
 200. Id. (“Because the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular State. This is 
consistent with the premises and unique genius of our Constitution.”). 
 201. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. (“Adjudicatory authority is appropriately exercised where ‘actions by the defendant 
himself’ give rise to the affiliation with the forum. How could McIntyre UK not have intended, by its 
actions targeting a national market, to sell products in the fourth largest destination for imports among 
all State of the United States and the largest scrap metal market?”) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)) (internal citation omitted). 
 203. See supra Part X.A. 
 204. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801. 
 205. It is in this context that the debate concerning the importance of federalism and state 
sovereignty concerns personal jurisdiction. The plurality in J. McIntyre seems to contend that because 
each state is sovereign, a defendant must manifest consent to the jurisdiction of each of those states 
independently. See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion). The dissent rejected such a 
scheme on the basis that personal jurisdiction is rooted in due process and not issues of state 
sovereignty and federalism. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Whatever the 
state of academic debate over the role of consent in modern jurisdictional doctrines, the plurality’s 
notion that consent is the animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court. 
Quite the contrary, the Court has explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction when its contacts with 
the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is 
unnecessary and unhelpful.”). This debate could be important in the jurisdictional analysis of a suit 
brought in a forum unrelated to the injury complained of but where the defendant has equally targeted 
the forum’s market. Such a suit would be possible under a theory of nationwide purposeful availment, 
and there is some precedent for finding jurisdiction in that context. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984). But when the suit is brought in the forum where the defendant has 
caused its products to be distributed and where the injury takes place, nationwide purposeful availment 
should be sufficient to support personal jurisdiction based on a stream of commerce theory. 
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defendant. If a defendant seeks to exploit the markets in every possible 
forum within the United States, it should hardly be objectionable that it 
could be sued in any forum in the United States.206 
4. Independent Reasonableness Test 
The stream of commerce theory serves to establish purposeful 
availment by a defendant of a particular forum where it has not directly 
acted in the forum. But purposeful availment is not the only requirement 
for the establishment of personal jurisdiction. One must remember that the 
establishment of minimum contacts is not a dispositive test for personal 
jurisdiction. Even where a court finds that minimum contacts exist, other 
factors may make the exercise of personal jurisdiction unreasonable.207 
Courts may consider such factors as the burden on the defendant, the 
interest of the forum state in the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in a 
convenient forum, and the judicial interest in efficient resolution of 
controversies.208 
Although Justice Brennan recognized the importance of this rule as a 
limitation on stream of commerce jurisdiction in his Asahi concurrence, 
the plurality and concurrence in J. McIntyre ignored the relationship 
between reasonableness and stream of commerce.209 Because of this 
independent reasonableness requirement for personal jurisdiction, the 
potential unwanted effects that concerned the J. McIntyre plurality and 
concurrence need not destroy the rule. Even where a small manufacturer 
has created minimum contacts by selling to a large national distributor 
locally, other considerations under the traditional notions of fair play and 
 
 
 206. The Supreme Court recognized a weaker form of this proposition in Keeton in the context of 
a claim arising from the content of a nationally distributed magazine. “Respondent produces a national 
publication aimed at a nationwide audience. There is no unfairness in calling it to answer for the 
contents of that publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and 
distributed.” Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781. Of course the difficulty with the Court’s formulation is in 
determining how many magazines constitutes a “substantial number” and how often they must be 
marketed in a forum to be deemed “regularly sold and distributed.” But if purposeful availment is the 
standard that must be met, the scope of distribution should not be dispositive. If a defendant has made 
a directed effort to distribute its product in a forum but has only sold a few units, it has no less 
purposefully availed itself of the forum than if it had sold thousands of units. If the intent of a 
manufacturer is to sell its product in a forum and the manufacturer succeeds even once, there is 
purposeful availment. 
 207. “Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts 
within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)). 
 208. Id. at 477. 
 209. See Borchers, supra note 23, at 1256–58. 
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substantial justice will protect the defendant from an unreasonable 
exercise of personal jurisdiction.210 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Much of the jurisprudence surrounding stream of commerce personal 
jurisdiction has been confused by the conflation of the standard for such 
jurisdiction and the methods for proving facts to meet that standard. By 
refocusing on the centrality of purposeful availment as shown through the 
intent of the defendant, courts can simplify the law of stream of commerce 
jurisdiction and provide more consistent results. 
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